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PRISONERS OF FAME: HOW AN EXPANDED 
USE OF INTRUSION UPON PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SECLUSION CAN PROTECT THE PRIVACY  
OF FORMER PUBLIC FIGURES 
David Libardoni* 
Abstract: Public figures who no longer receive attention in the public 
sphere have had enormous difficulty regaining the privacy rights they 
once had. When it comes to limiting the discussion of their personal af-
fairs, both the First Amendment and the common law invasion of privacy 
torts make no distinctions between former public figures and those cur-
rently involved in public affairs. This Note proposes an expanded use of 
the invasion of privacy tort for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion to 
protect the privacy of these “prisoners of fame.” Although the tort is pri-
marily understood to protect individuals from intrusions into physical 
spaces, this cause of action also protects intrusions into psychological 
spaces. Former public figures, therefore, must be empowered to bring 
this claim when offensive public discourse concerning their most private, 
intimate affairs intrudes upon their psychological seclusion. 
Introduction 
 At the 2013 Golden Globe Awards, Jodie Foster was honored with a 
lifetime achievement award for her forty-seven-year film career.1 Ac-
cepting her award in front of Hollywood’s elite and a television audi-
ence of nearly twenty million, the fifty-year-old actress publicly ad-
 
* David Libardoni is the Editor in Chief of Volume 55 of the Boston College Law Review. 
1 Alessandra Stanley, The Lifting of a Veil, Discreetly, N.Y. Times (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/01/15/movies/awardsseason/jodie-foster-lifts-a-veil-at-golden-globes.html?_r 
=1&. The Golden Globe Awards are given out annually by the Hollywood Foreign Press Asso-
ciation (“HFPA”) to honor the year’s best achievements in television and film. History of the 
Golden Globes, Golden Globes, http://www.goldenglobes.org/history/ (last visited May 20, 
2013). At its annual awards ceremony, the HFPA also presents the Cecil B. Demille Award to 
an individual who has made an outstanding contribution to entertainment. Id. Foster won this 
award in 2013. Julie Miller, Ten Wildly Varying Interpretations of Jodie Foster’s Golden Globes Speech, 
Vanity Fair ( Jan. 14, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/online/oscars/2013/01/ 
jodie-foster-golden-globe-speech-coming-out-reviews. 
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dressed the question of her sexuality.2 In her speech, Foster vigorously 
defended her right to privacy in a society in which “every celebrity is 
expected to honor the details of their private life with a press confer-
ence, a fragrance, and a primetime reality show.”3 Foster followed that 
quip with her strongest argument for her right to privacy, stating, “But 
seriously, if you had been a public figure from the time that you were a 
toddler, if you’d had to fight for a life that felt real and honest and 
normal against all odds, then maybe then you, too, might value privacy 
above all else.”4 Whether interpreted as inspiring, passionate, or even 
hypocritical, Foster’s speech captured the societal and emotional pres-
sures she and other public figures face.5 
 Public figures like Jodie Foster face enormous legal hurdles when 
trying to protect their sense of privacy.6 Constitutionally, the First 
Amendment affords “breathing space” for false speech about public 
figures by placing higher burdens of proof on plaintiffs who bring def-
amation and false light invasion of privacy claims.7 The freedom of the 
                                                                                                                      
 
2 Stanley, supra note 1. Although she had never addressed her sexuality to such a large 
audience, Foster had previously acknowledged her relationship with a female partner in a 
2008 speech at the Women in Entertainment luncheon. Id. 
3 Jodie Foster’s Extraordinary Cecil B. Demille Speech, Golden Globes, http://www.golden 
globes.org/2013/01/i-will-continue-to-tell-stories-to-move-people-by-being-moved-jodie-fosters- 
extraordinary-cecil-b-de-mille-speech/ (last visited May 20, 2013). 
4 See id. 
5 See Miller, supra note 1 (providing various commentary on Foster’s speech from ce-
lebrities and public figures). 
6 See, e.g., Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (barring a public figure from re-
covering for intentional infliction of emotional distress absent a showing of actual malice); 
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding that a plaintiff could not 
recover for a claim of publication of private facts based on publication of information 
obtained from court records); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 (1974) 
( justifying an actual malice standard for public figure plaintiffs in defamation cases be-
cause public figures have access to self-help in the media and voluntarily expose them-
selves to the risk of injurious falsehoods). 
7 See U.S. Const. amend. I (providing that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press”). Defamation is a state common law cause of action 
that protects individuals from the publication of a false statement of fact that tends to in-
jure the reputation of those individuals in the community. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 558–559 (1977) (detailing the elements of a defamation claim and defining a 
defamatory statement); see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72, 279–80 (1964) 
(holding that public figure defamation plaintiffs must prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that false materials were published with actual malice—knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard of the truth—rather than simply negligence). False light invasion of privacy 
occurs when a defendant gives false or misleading publicity to a plaintiff that tends to in-
jure the plaintiff’s reputation in the community. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E 
(detailing the cause of action for publicity placing a person in a false light); see Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) (holding that constitutional protections of speech and 
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press and the public’s “right to know” have also limited the utility of the 
common law invasion of privacy claim for the publication of private, 
truthful facts.8 Moreover, legislation attempting to target offensive 
newsgathering methods, such as antipaparazzi statutes, falls short when 
trying to address privacy concerns that conflict with First Amendment 
principles.9 Similarly, the common law invasion of privacy claim for in-
trusion upon seclusion has been mainly understood to prohibit offen-
sive intrusions into private, physical spaces.10 
 Notwithstanding these problems, the U.S. Supreme Court has de-
fined degrees of public figure status under the First Amendment that 
correspond with plaintiffs’ burden of proof when trying to recover for 
the publication of false information.11 In 1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch 
Inc., the Court established three classes of public figures in the context 
of defamation.12 First, all-purpose public figures are those individuals, 
like Jodie Foster, who have reached levels of “pervasive power and in-
fluence” in society.13 Second, limited-purpose public figures are indi-
viduals who voluntarily enter into a specific public controversy in order 
to influence the outcome of that particular issue.14 Finally, involuntary 
                                                                                                                      
 
expression preclude recovery under New York’s privacy statute for publishing false state-
ments about matters of public concern unless accompanied by actual malice). 
8 See Cox, 420 U.S. at 494–95; Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th 
Cir. 1993); Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); Peter B. Edelman, 
Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1204 (1990) 
(suggesting that the freedom of the press has been extended to protect the publication of 
information gathered by any means short of criminally sanctioned action). The publica-
tion of private facts cause of action allows individuals to recover for publicity given to pri-
vate facts that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 652D (detailing the cause of action for the unreasonable publication of private 
facts); infra notes 91–104 and accompanying text. 
9 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1461, 1536–37 (2000); 
Camrin L. Crisci, Note, All the World Is Not a Stage: Finding a Right to Privacy in Existing and 
Proposed Legislation, 6 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 207, 214 (2002) (describing the newswor-
thy defense for the publication of private facts tort as the greatest impediment to antipapa-
razzi legislation). 
10 See infra notes 43–65 and accompanying text. 
11 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351. The Court has arguably defined public figure status for 
all First Amendment purposes and not just defamation. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 
U.S. 448, 453 (1976) (suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of “public fig-
ure” in the 1974 case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., controls for purposes of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments). 
12 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351. 
13 See id. 
14 Id.; Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 69 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding the plain-
tiff was a limited-purpose public figure regarding a city’s public school hiring policies be-
cause he publicly lobbied for a teaching position and consented to be interviewed by a 
local newspaper prior to the defendants’ alleged defamation); see also Wells v. Liddy, 186 
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public figures are individuals who are drawn into a public controversy 
through no intentional action of their own.15 Generally speaking, lim-
ited-purpose and involuntary public figures are required to present a 
clear and convincing showing of actual malice—knowledge of falsity or 
the reckless disregard of the truth—for establishing defamation only if 
the defamatory material relates to the matters that make them public 
figures.16 Conversely, all-purpose public figures must prove actual mal-
ice in all defamation cases.17 
 When it comes to the publication of truthful information, how-
ever, there is no common law distinction between the treatment of all-
purpose, limited-purpose, and involuntary public figures.18 Courts have 
ruled that voluntary public figures (i.e., all-purpose and limited-
purpose individuals) waive their privacy rights by seeking prominence 
in the public forum.19 Instead of consenting to the loss of privacy, in-
voluntary public figures are deemed to have simply lost their privacy 
rights due to the “newsworthiness” of their lives.20 
 More disconcerting is the treatment of former public figures— indi-
viduals who had once been involved in a particular public controversy 
but have since receded from the public sphere—because there is cur-
                                                                                                                      
F.3d 505, 534–37 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying a five-factor test to determine whether the 
plaintiff qualified as a limited-purpose public figure). 
15 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; see also Wells, 186 F.3d at 539–41 (developing a multifactor test 
to determine whether a plaintiff qualifies as an involuntary public figure). 
16 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. 
17 See id. 
18 Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. e (1977) (“[T]he legitimate 
interest of the public in[voluntary public figures] may extend beyond those matters which 
are themselves made public, and to some reasonable extent may include information as to 
matters that would otherwise be private.”), with id. § 652D cmt. f (“As in the case of the 
voluntary public figure, the authorized publicity [of an involuntary public figure] is not 
limited to the event that itself arouses the public interest, and to some reasonable extent 
includes publicity given to facts about the individual that would otherwise be purely pri-
vate.”). 
19 See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (noting that individuals who voluntarily create and seek public attention relinquish 
their privacy rights); Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652, 660 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1979) (finding that the plaintiffs did not have a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in their academic records because they voluntarily accepted membership on an NCAA 
basketball team); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. e. 
20 See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922–23 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (suggesting 
that individuals closely associated with voluntary public figures lose privacy rights through 
no choice of their own); Harris v. Horton, 341 S.W.3d 264, 273–74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding that the plaintiff lost privacy rights in the publication of his deceased son’s pho-
tographs because his son became an involuntary public figure after his fatal automobile 
accident), overruled on other grounds by Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 
n.6 (Tenn. 2012); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. f. 
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rently no way for them to regain the privacy rights they once had as pri-
vate citizens.21 Someone like Jodie Foster will never become a former 
public figure due to her pervasive status in society and the public’s con-
tinuing curiosity with her life and films.22 A person like Dolores Hart, 
however, presents a different situation.23 Hart, a young starlet who was 
the recipient of Elvis Presley’s first on-screen kiss, famously left Holly-
wood in 1963 to become a cloistered nun, only to reappear in a 2012 
documentary depicting her transformation into “Mother Dolores.”24 If 
she had wanted to protect her privacy and stop the dissemination of 
her life story, she would have had extreme difficulty bringing a viable 
claim for publication of private facts.25 Similarly, private individuals 
who become public figures even for mere minutes—whether they are 
YouTube sensations, bloggers, or other social-media participants—may 
never be able to regain the privacy rights they once had.26 
                                                                                                                      
21 See, e.g., Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1229, 1236 (6th Cir. 1981) (ruling 
that the plaintiff, who had been a public figure in rape trials forty years prior to defama-
tion and false light claims for historical reproduction of trials, was still a public figure); 
Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–10 (denying recovery for the publication of a truthful news story 
about a child prodigy thirty years after he became a public figure); Uranga v. Federated 
Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 35 (Idaho 2003) (holding that a newspaper that published a story 
recounting a forty-year-old sex scandal could not be held liable for invasion of privacy 
when using the plaintiff’s name in a photographic representation of a public court docu-
ment); Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 429, 431 (La. 1983) (ruling that a plaintiff who 
had been convicted of a crime twenty-five years prior to his invasion of privacy claim based 
on a reprinted news article about his trial was still a public figure); see also Jasmine E. 
McNealy, The Emerging Conflict Between Newsworthiness and the Right to Be Forgotten, 39 N. Ky. 
L. Rev. 119, 128 (2012) (recognizing that a right to be forgotten is most at odds with the 
notion in American privacy law that the public’s interest in particular news stories and 
individuals does not diminish over time). But see Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93–94 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1931) (granting a reformed prostitute privacy protection after a publication focused 
on incidents that were damaging to her character and social standing) Although courts 
have continued to call these individuals simply public figures, this Note refers to them as 
“former public figures.” See infra notes 22–270 and accompanying text. 
22 See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809 (holding that the public’s curiosity about the plaintiff was a 
matter of public concern, and therefore denying recovery for invasion of privacy); Scott J. 
Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Figures, 
49 Am. Bus. L.J. 125, 145 (2012) (“Entertainers, professional sports figures, and corporate 
executives all fall into the voluntary public figure category and hold almost as limited a 
claim to a right of privacy as do public officials.”). 
23 See Wendy Carlson, A Nun Returns to the Red Carpet, N.Y. Times (Feb. 26, 2012), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/nyregion/a-preview-of-god-is-the-bigger-elvis-starring-dolores- 
hart.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
24 See id. 
25 See, e.g., Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35; Roshto, 439 So. 2d at 431–32. 
26 See Linton Weeks, Privacy 2.0, We Are All Celebrities Now, NPR (Apr. 26, 2011, 11:27AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/04/27/135538176/privacy-inc-we-are-all-celebrities-now. 
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 This Note argues that the common law invasion of privacy tort for 
intrusion upon seclusion, rather than the publication of private facts 
tort, provides a workable solution for certain limited-purpose and in-
voluntary former public figures.27 Because expectations of privacy ex-
tend beyond physical spaces, these plaintiffs are entitled to a remedy 
when offensive public discourse intrudes upon their psychological se-
clusion.28 
 Part I introduces the invasion of privacy torts for intrusion upon 
seclusion and publication of private facts, including a discussion of the 
policy and limitations surrounding psychological seclusion.29 It also 
addresses the constitutional treatment of both types of invasion of pri-
vacy claims.30 Part II then explains what happens when public figures 
bring invasion of privacy claims for intrusion upon seclusion and publi-
cation of private facts.31 In addition, Part II describes the treatment of 
former public figures when bringing a publication of private facts cause 
of action, and discusses courts’ tendency to overlook the amount of 
time between the end of an individual’s “public” life and the offensive 
publication.32 
                                                                                                                     
 Finally, Part III argues that former public figures can assert claims 
for intrusion upon psychological seclusion when an individual offen-
sively disseminates information that reveals intimate personal informa-
tion, including private sexual affairs.33 Despite the challenging legal 
hurdles that would confront psychological seclusion claims, the num-
ber of public figures arising through social-media participation may 
provide the necessary policy justification for embracing this underuti-
lized theory of recovery.34 
 
27 See infra notes 35–270 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 198–270 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 35–129 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 105–129 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 130–196 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 169–196 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 198–270 and accompanying text. This Note does not consider the 
question of whether an all-purpose public figure could use this cause of action because, 
realistically, these individuals would have no means of recovering for emotional injuries 
caused by the publication of truthful information. Cf. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56–57 & n.5 
(holding that Jerry Falwell, a nationally syndicated television host and a founder of the 
Moral Majority, could not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress because 
the publication did not contain a false statement of fact made with actual malice). 
34 See infra notes 225–270 and accompanying text. 
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I. Invasion of Privacy Torts: The Elements and Their 
Constitutional Limitations 
 The modern day invasion of privacy torts stem primarily from Pro-
fessor William Prosser’s 1960 article Privacy.35 Recognizing the distinct 
privacy interests encompassed in a generalized right to privacy, Profes-
sor Prosser articulated four separate causes of action that would align 
with those specific interests.36 For example, unreasonable intrusion 
upon seclusion was intended to protect a mental interest, whereas the 
tort for publication of private facts was meant primarily to protect an 
individual’s reputational interest in truthful information.37 All of the pri-
vacy torts, however, share the underlying interest of protecting an indi-
vidual’s “right to be let alone.”38 
                                                                                                                     
 This Part provides a thorough explanation of the common law in-
vasion of privacy torts typically used by former public figures to recover 
for the acquisition and dissemination of truthful information—namely, 
intrusion upon seclusion and publication of private facts.39 Section A 
provides the elements of the intrusion upon seclusion tort and intro-
duces the concept of psychological seclusion—an intrusion into a men-
 
35 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960); see also Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1887, 
1888 (2010) (“It is impossible to talk about privacy in American tort law without consider-
ing William Prosser.”). 
36 See Prosser, supra note 35, at 389. Serving as chief reporter for the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, Professor Prosser incorporated his own formulation of tort privacy into the 
Restatement’s language. Richards & Solove, supra note 35, at 1890. The four torts are now 
referred to as: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropria-
tion of another’s name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to another’s private 
life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977). 
37 Prosser, supra note 35, at 392, 398; see also Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation 
and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1341, 1412 (2011) (explaining that the publi-
cation of private facts and false light torts primarily aim to prevent the disclosure of true or 
misleading information that a plaintiff fears will harm his or her reputation). 
38 See Prosser, supra note 35, at 389; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right 
to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 193 (1890). 
39 See infra notes 43–129 and accompanying text. This Note does not consider the inva-
sion of privacy tort for misappropriation of name or likeness. See Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 652C. Because this Note seeks to put forth a theory of recovery for publicly 
reexamining the lives of former public figures, it is not concerned with these individuals’ 
“right to publicity” or their proprietary interest in the use of their name and likeness. See 
id.; Prosser, supra note 35, at 406–07. Moreover, due to this Note’s focus on the revelation 
of new, truthful information never before publicized, it does not consider false light inva-
sion of privacy claims, either. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E; infra notes 40–
270 and accompanying text. 
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tal, rather than a spatial or locational, place.40 Section B then intro-
duces the tort of publication of private facts.41 Finally, Section C con-
siders the constitutional limitations regarding claims for intrusion upon 
seclusion and publication of private facts.42 
A. Intrusion upon Seclusion: Protecting Physical and Psychological Solitude 
1. The Elements of an Intrusion upon Seclusion Claim 
 To establish a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant intentionally interfered in his or her private 
affairs in a way that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.43 
The injury lies in the intrusive act itself, rather than in some subsequent 
act by the defendant.44 Accordingly, whether or not a defendant profits 
from invading the plaintiff’s privacy is irrelevant.45 Instead, courts gen-
erally look to the nature and pattern of a defendant’s alleged intrusion 
to see whether an invasion of privacy has occurred.46 Courts may also 
consider the circumstances surrounding the intrusion, the intruder’s 
motives, the setting, and the plaintiff’s own privacy expectations.47 
 Most jurisdictions recognize intrusions into a plaintiff’s private af-
fairs through physical, electronic, sensory, or other investigatory 
means.48 Intrusions may include hacking e-mail accounts, eavesdrop-
                                                                                                                      
 
40 See infra notes 43–90 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 91–104 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 105–129 and accompanying text. 
43 See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 
2002) (adopting the Restatement’s definition of intrusion upon seclusion). 
44 See Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 997 (Kan. 1977) (stating that liability rests on the 
defendant’s conduct); Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., Inc., 964 A.2d 374, 379 (Pa. 2009) 
(holding that the defendant could not be held liable for intrusion upon seclusion when he 
legitimately obtained information that was publicly disclosed). 
45 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmts. a & b (1977). 
46 See Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (E.D. Wis. 2002); 
Jones v. U.S. Child Support Recovery, 961 F. Supp. 1518, 1521 (D. Utah 1997); Sanders v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 77 (Cal. 1999). 
47 See Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1421 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 
643, 648 (Cal. 1994). 
48 See, e.g., Russ v. Causey, 732 F. Supp. 2d 589, 608 (E.D.N.C. 2010); Wolfson, 924 F. 
Supp. at 1419 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b). Comment b of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains: 
The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff 
has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s 
room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s objection in entering his home. 
It may also be by the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechani-
cal aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into 
1463 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
ping on phone conversations,49 or using hidden cameras.50 Despite the 
evolving means of intruding into a person’s privacy, the key legal ques-
tion has remained constant: was the intrusion highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person?51 
 Determining when an intrusion becomes highly offensive requires 
examining the type of seclusion that plaintiffs have established, and 
consequently, their basic expectations of privacy.52 Plaintiffs have little 
difficulty establishing their expectation of privacy when an individual 
has intruded upon their home, mail, or bathroom.53 Plaintiffs generally 
cannot, however, claim that an intrusion is highly offensive if the inva-
sion occurred in view of the public, because in public, individuals have 
a very limited expectation of privacy.54 In a similar vein, acquiring pub-
lic records or documents that are readily accessible does not rise to a 
sufficient level of offensiveness.55 
 Although the standard for seclusion is limited in many jurisdictions, 
some states like California have tried using a multifactored approach for 
identifying seclusion.56 For instance, in the 2009 case, Hernandez v. Hill-
sides, Inc., the California Supreme Court confronted the issue of work-
                                                                                                                      
his upstairs windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It may be 
by some other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, 
as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, 
examining his private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court or-
der to permit an inspection of his personal documents. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b. 
49 See Fischer, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 927–28 (finding that hacking an e-mail account and lis-
tening to a telephone conversation could constitute unreasonable intrusions). 
50 See Sanders, 978 P.2d at 77 (holding that a journalist’s covert videotaping of an em-
ployee in the workplace could constitute an unreasonable intrusion). 
51 See Med. Lab., 306 F.3d at 812 (“‘There is likewise no liability unless the interference 
with the plaintiff’s seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive 
. . . .’” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. d (1977))). 
52 See Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 877 (8th Cir. 
2000) (referring to the legitimate expectation of privacy as “the touchstone” of the intru-
sion upon seclusion tort). 
53 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b. 
54 See King v. Metcalf 56 Homes Ass’n, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1146 (D. Kan. 2005) (dis-
missing an intrusion upon seclusion claim because the plaintiff’s actions were readily view-
able in public). 
55 See, e.g., Trundle v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 396, 401 (D. Md. 2001) 
(acquiring public credit reports cannot form the basis of an intrusion upon seclusion 
claim); Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32 (acquiring public court documents cannot form the basis of 
an intrusion upon seclusion claim). 
56 Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1078–82 (Cal. 2009); see also Andrew Jay 
McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public 
Places, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 989, 1055 (1995) (discussing the lack of clarity and imprecise stan-
dards for seclusion under section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). 
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place surveillance within the context of an intrusion upon seclusion 
claim.57 The Hernandez court framed its analysis of an intrusion upon 
seclusion claim according to the underlying aim of the cause of action: 
to recognize a measure of control over an individual’s personal serenity 
and life choices.58 This overarching concern helped link the concept of 
seclusion to circumstances and factors that impacted the plaintiff’s level 
of autonomy when facing a situation implicating privacy concerns.59 
These factors for evaluating the expectation of privacy prong of an in-
trusion claim included: (1) the identity of the intruder; (2) the level of 
access to the place and the degree to which an individual could see and 
hear the plaintiff; and (3) the means of intrusion.60 Taken in isolation 
or in conjunction, these factors can be used to determine when some-
one has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.61 
 In addition to factors addressing privacy expectations, California 
courts have also emphasized the objective context of any intrusion up-
on seclusion inquiry.62 As such, when addressing the “offensiveness” 
prong of the cause of action, a court will examine all of the circum-
stances surrounding the intrusion.63 These considerations include the 
degree and setting of the intrusion, as well as the intruder’s conduct, 
motives, and objectives.64 Combined with the factors that evaluate an 
individual’s reasonable privacy expectations, this totality approach rec-
ognizes the fact-specific nature of any seclusion inquiry.65 
2. Psychological Seclusion: Protecting a Person’s Emotional Sanctum 
 Not only does intrusion upon seclusion protect individuals from 
intrusions into private, physical spaces, but it also protects a plaintiff 
from intrusions into psychological spaces.66 The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides that liability exists when a defendant invades a private 
place, or when a plaintiff “otherwise has invaded a private seclusion 
                                                                                                                      
57 See 211 P.3d at 1072. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 1072–73. 
60 Id. at 1073. 
61 Id. at 1074. 
62 See id. at 1072–73; Hill, 865 P.2d at 648; Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 
679 (Ct. App. 1987). 
63 See Hill, 865 P.2d at 648; Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679. 
64 Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1073; Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679. 
65 See Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1073; Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679. 
66 See McSurely v. McClennan, 753 F.2d 88, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c (1977)); Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc. 
(Phillips I), 711 F.2d 1524, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). 
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that [the] plaintiff has thrown about his [or her] person or affairs.”67 
This language has given courts the necessary flexibility when evaluating 
a defendant who has engaged in highly intrusive behavior that does not 
fit neatly into any of the other invasion of privacy torts.68 Some cases, 
however, demonstrate that psychological seclusion cannot protect 
against behavior that is otherwise offensive or harassing when defen-
dants claim that the behavior was in public view.69 
 Psychological seclusion exists in those situations in which the in-
vestigation and examination of a person’s private affairs breaches that 
person’s deepest emotional spaces.70 The clearest recognition of intru-
sion upon psychological seclusion occurred in the 1983 case, Phillips v. 
Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit sent certified questions on state privacy law to the Ala-
bama Supreme Court.71 In Phillips, the plaintiff, Brenda Phillips, had 
just begun working for the defendant, but within days of starting her 
job, she faced weekly closed-door questioning from her boss about her 
personal life and sexual proclivities.72 Eventually, the defendant termi-
                                                                                                                      
67 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c. 
68 E.g., McSurely, 753 F.2d at 112–13 (implying that the defendant intruded upon the 
plaintiff’s psychological seclusion when he stood next to the plaintiff and pressured him to 
read aloud every page of his wife’s private documents that disclosed her premarital rela-
tionship with her former boss); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (hold-
ing that a defendant who shadowed and monitored the plaintiff was liable for intrusion 
upon seclusion); Van Jelgerhuis v. Mercury Fin. Co., 940 F. Supp. 1344, 1368 (S.D. Ind. 
1996) (finding intrusion upon psychological seclusion based on the defendant’s question-
ing and commenting about the plaintiff’s appearance in a public work environment). 
69 See, e.g., Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 858 (R.I. 1998); Harris, 341 S.W.3d at 271–
72. 
70 See Van Jelgerhuis, 940 F. Supp. at 1368; Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc. (Phillips II ), 
435 So. 2d 705, 710–11 (Ala. 1983); Bennett v. Norban, 151 A.2d 476, 479 (Penn. 1959). 
71 Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1532, 1536–37; Phillips II, 435 So. 2d at 706, 710–11. The plain-
tiff had originally filed her claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1526; see 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). The invasion of privacy claims under Alabama tort law were 
pendent state law claims attached to this federal question. Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1526; see 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). Given the lack of precedent concerning the state law intrusion 
upon seclusion claim, the Eleventh Circuit certified the intrusion upon seclusion questions 
to the Alabama Supreme Court prior to ruling on the appeal. Phillips II, 435 So. 2d at 706; 
see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (giving federal courts discretion to sever novel state law claims that 
stem from the same nucleus of operative fact). 
72 Phillips II, 435 So. 2d at 707. The interrogations escalated into weekly questions 
about her sexual preferences, as well as solicitations for sexual favors. Id. During one 
closed-door conversation, the plaintiff’s boss demanded that she give him oral sex three 
times a week. Id. When the plaintiff forced her way out of the office, her boss hit her across 
the bottom with the back of his hand. Id. 
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nated Phillips’s position.73 At trial, Phillips’s family practitioner pro-
vided expert testimony that the events surrounding her employment 
and subsequent firing caused chronic anxiety for months afterward.74 
Adopting the concept of psychological seclusion, the court ultimately 
held that the defendant’s consistent interrogations into Phillips’s sexual 
proclivities were actionable under Alabama privacy law.75 
 In recognizing the interest in a person’s emotional stability, the 
Phillips court refused to narrow the concept of seclusion to physical 
spaces.76 The defendant had argued that because solitude requires the 
absence of other people, the concept of seclusion assumes the presence 
of a physical place.77 Consequently, the defendant reasoned that peo-
ple cannot seclude themselves from others without removing them-
selves to a separate, isolated space.78 In rejecting this argument, the 
Alabama Supreme Court declared that “[o]ne’s emotional sanctum is 
certainly due the same expectations of privacy as one’s physical envi-
ronment.”79 Examinations or investigations into private affairs, the 
court reasoned, can constitute overly intrusive behavior.80 
                                                                                                                     
 Rather than focusing on the setting of the intrusion, a breach into 
a plaintiff’s psychological seclusion ultimately focuses on the specific 
emotional sanctuary the plaintiff needs to maintain psychological sta-
bility.81 For example, in 1986, in Russell v. Salve Regina College, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Rhode Island determined that the de-
 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 708. 
75 See id. at 711. In the 1996 case, Van Jelgerhuis v. Mercury Finance Co., which also con-
cerned workplace harassment, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss an invasion of privacy claim based on psycho-
logical seclusion. See 940 F. Supp. at 1368. Acknowledging the tort’s “undefined parame-
ters,” the court found that the defendant’s questioning of the plaintiff’s appearance, cou-
pled with him telling her about his sexual dreams and fantasies, crossed the threshold of 
highly offensive examination. See id. at 1351, 1368; see also Miller v. Edwards Jones & Co., 
355 F. Supp. 2d 629, 645 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding that sexual questions in the workplace 
may be grounds for a claim of intrusion upon psychological seclusion). 
76 See Phillips II, 435 So. 2d at 711. 
77 Id. at 710. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 711. 
80 See id. For this discussion, the court relied heavily on key language within the com-
ments of section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id. at 710–11. This analysis 
included emphasizing “other form” and “examination” in section 652B, comment (b), as 
well as “otherwise” and “affairs” in section 652B, comment (c). See id. at 710–11 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmts. b & c (1977)). 
81 See Russell v. Salve Regina Coll. (Russell I ), 649 F. Supp. 391, 404 (D.R.I. 1986); Phil-
lips II, 435 So. 2d at 711; David A. Elder, The Law of Privacy 42–43 (1991) (describing 
the privacy interest in seclusion as “psychic integrity”). 
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fendant’s examination of the plaintiff’s weight problems was sufficient 
to establish an action for invasion of privacy for intrusion upon seclu-
sion.82 The plaintiff was a severely overweight nursing student who ex-
perienced, in her words, “torment” from her college as a result of her 
weight problem.83 Viewing the tort as protecting intimate, personal 
matters, the court reasoned that, in the plaintiff’s eyes, her weight issue 
was presumably one of the most private and intimate concerns of her 
life.84 Accordingly, the court held that a reasonable jury could find the 
nursing faculty’s preoccupation with the plaintiff’s weight loss regimen 
and the continuous inquiries into her dietary habits constitute an un-
reasonable intrusion upon seclusion.85 
 Both Russell and Phillips also establish that claims for intrusion up-
on psychological seclusion do not require surreptitious behavior.86 Be-
cause the tort is not necessarily limited to physical spaces, a plaintiff can 
experience intrusions into emotional spaces even when those actions 
are conducted in view of the public.87 
                                                                                                                      
 
82 See Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 404. The Rhode Island legislature has codified the four in-
vasion of privacy torts. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1(a) (2012). To recover for the right to be 
secure from unreasonable intrusion upon one’s physical solitude or seclusion, a plaintiff 
must establish an invasion of something entitled to be private, and must show that the inva-
sion was offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. Id. § 9-1-28.1(a)(1)(i)(A)–(B). 
83 Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 394–95. 
84 See id. at 404 (“[F]ew things are more personal or private to a young, single person 
than weight and one’s efforts to control it.”). 
85 See id. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s obesity was not a private concern 
itself due to the fact that it was exposed to the public. Id. (“To be sure, there was nothing 
private or confidential about Russell’s corpulence (it was there to be seen at the most cas-
ual glance), so drawing attention to her girth would not, in and of itself, be actionable as 
an invasion of privacy under Rhode Island law.”). 
After the plaintiff won on summary judgment, the court later ruled in the defendant’s 
favor on a directed verdict. Russell v. Salve Regina Coll. (Russell II ), 890 F.2d 484, 485 (1st 
Cir. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 225 (1991). On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit upheld the verdict based on the statute’s language of protecting only 
physical solitude. Id. at 488 (“The only area ‘invaded’ was Russell’s psyche. We cannot light-
ly predict that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would interpret the statute contrary to its 
literal language . . . .”). 
86 See Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 404; Phillips II, 435 So. 2d at 709. For this question, the 
Phillips II court relied on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in the 1959 case, 
Bennett v. Norban. See Phillps II, 435 So. 2d at 710 (discussing Bennett, 151 A.2d at 477, 479). 
In Bennett, the defendant had publicly blocked the plaintiff’s walking path, ordered her to 
take off her coat, reached into her dress pockets, and examined her purse. Bennett, 151 
A.2d at 477. The court held that although these actions were done openly, they substan-
tially interfered with the plaintiff’s desire for anonymity and constituted an intrusion be-
yond the limits of decency. Id. at 479. 
87 See Russell, 649 F. Supp. at 404; Phillips II, 435 So. 2d at 709–10; Bennett, 151 A.2d at 
479; McClurg, supra note 56, at 1055 (arguing that the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ defini-
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1468 
 Some courts, however, have not recognized the concept of psycho-
logical seclusion, especially when the factual setting somehow relates to 
the public sphere.88 If intrusive, even offensive, behavior occurs in pub-
lic view, plaintiffs cannot maintain a personal sphere of privacy when 
confronted with that behavior.89 As a result, these courts have relied on 
objective elements, like the setting and nature of the intrusion, to deny 
claims for intrusions on psychological seclusion.90 
B. Invasion of Privacy Based on the Publication of Private Facts 
 Like an invasion of privacy claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a 
cause of action for the publication of private facts also requires behav-
ior that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.91 Liability within this 
tort, however, rests on the offensiveness of the publication.92 Thus, the 
context of the publication and its actual content are important consid-
erations when evaluating whether the facts are sufficiently embarrass-
ing to allow recovery.93 
                                                                                                                      
tion of the intrusion upon seclusion tort is broad enough to include intrusions in public 
places). 
88 See Pospicil v. Buying Office, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (refus-
ing to recognize psychological seclusion in this case because the defendant’s language, 
jokes, and conduct occurred in a public workplace); Harris, 341 S.W.3d at 271–72 (reject-
ing the plaintiff’s theory that she “threw a blanket of seclusion” around photographs of 
her deceased son’s body since the pictures were taken in a public place). 
89 See Pospicil, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1361; Harris, 341 S.W.3d at 271–72. For example, in the 
1998 case, Swerdlick v. Koch, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to expand the con-
cept of seclusion under its statutory intrusion upon seclusion cause of action. 721 A.2d at 
858. Swerdlick involved a neighbor who had been photographing the outside of the plain-
tiff’s private residence and logging the business activities taking place there over the 
course of a year to document violations of local zoning by-laws. Id. at 853–54. Despite the 
emotional distress and physical ailments that the plaintiffs experienced from being under 
constant surveillance, the court held that the defendant’s actions did not disturb the plain-
tiff’s mental sanctity. Id. at 858. In light of the statute’s emphasis on protecting physical 
seclusion, the court would not expand the statute’s meaning to also cover observations of 
behavior that occur in plain public view. Id. Not only was there no physical intrusion, but 
the court also indicated that the defendant had not personally harassed the plaintiffs when 
they appeared outside of their home. Id. Nevertheless, the court did acknowledge that the 
behavior, though outside the scope of the privacy statute, may have been offensive. Id. 
90 See Pospicil, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1361; Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 858; Harris, 341 S.W.3d at 
271–72. 
91 Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(a) (1977). 
92 Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(a). 
93 See Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (contrasting 
publicizing a photo of a couple kissing in public with a photo of a couple kissing in a hotel 
room); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c (“The protection afforded to the 
plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and place, to 
the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.”). 
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 It must also be substantially certain that the embarrassing facts will 
become public knowledge.94 This publicity requirement, therefore, is 
not satisfied when the facts are simply repeated to a person other than 
the plaintiff, or even to a threshold number of third parties.95 Instead, 
the disclosure must be a sufficiently public communication given the 
facts and circumstances of each case.96 
 Even if the facts are deemed private and have been publicized, the 
facts cannot be “newsworthy” or a matter of legitimate public concern.97 
Accordingly, this element of the publication of private facts tort requires 
courts to determine whether the facts are “newsworthy” enough to pre-
clude recovery for plaintiffs asserting this type of invasion of privacy 
claim.98 For example, in 1998, in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 
the California Supreme Court articulated several factors that should be 
assessed when courts make a determination of newsworthiness.99 First, a 
court necessarily has to assess the social value of the facts published be-
cause the public interest in a certain matter must be legitimate.100 Sec-
ond, coupled with this assessment, a newsworthiness test also compares 
the publication’s level of intrusion into a plaintiff’s private affairs with 
the plaintiff’s position in society.101 
 Third, courts also give substantial deference to the media to de-
termine the newsworthiness of truthful publications.102 As a result, mat-
ters of legitimate public interest are not just limited to “news,” but may 
also extend to educational, historical, or entertaining publications that 
                                                                                                                      
94 Harris by Harris v. Easton Publ’g Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a (describing publicity as a required element 
of the publication of private facts tort). 
95 E.g., Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 377–78 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) 
(holding that publicity, rather than publication, is a requirement of the publication of 
private facts tort). 
96 Id., 940 P.2d at 377–78; Harris by Harris, 483 A.2d at 1384. 
97 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(b). 
98 E.g., Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484–85 
(Cal. 1998); Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35; see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: 
A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291, 351–61 (1983) (ar-
ticulating various tests used by courts for determining the newsworthiness defense to pub-
lication of private facts). 
99 955 P.2d at 483–85. 
100 Id. at 483. 
101 Id. at 484. Part II of this Note discusses further the attention on the plaintiff’s status 
in society—i.e., public figure status. See infra notes 130–196 and accompanying text. 
102 E.g., Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809; Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35; see Zim-
merman, supra note 98, at 353. 
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a news entity thinks would be appealing to its viewers.103 Because the 
tort inherently targets the actions of publishers rather than private citi-
zens, the discretion given to determinations of newsworthiness also acts 
as a countervailing interest to the media.104 
C. The Constitutional Dimension of Common Law Invasion of Privacy 
 The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution promotes the free 
flow of ideas and information by guaranteeing an “uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open” debate on public issues.105 Concerns about infringing 
on an individual’s notions of privacy either through the dissemination 
of information or through offensive speech directly clash with the free-
doms of speech and the press secured by the First Amendment.106 Ac-
cordingly, the First Amendment provides a defense for state tort law 
suits, including invasion of privacy claims.107 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485 (“‘[Newsworthiness] extends also to the use of names, 
likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for purposes of education, amuse-
ment or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate 
interest in what is published.’” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. j 
(1977))); see also Zimmerman, supra note 98, at 354 (noting that the economics of journal-
ism makes the media arguably the best measure of what the public wants to know). 
104 See Harris by Harris, 483 A.2d at 1384; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D 
cmt. a (“On the other hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small 
circulation . . . is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term as it is used 
. . . .”). 
105 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270; see Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (con-
cluding that “[a]s a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public 
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate”); Hustler, 485 U.S. at 51 (recognizing 
the Court’s role to be “vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free 
from governmentally imposed sanctions”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984) (“The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to 
speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—
but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”). 
106 See Cox, 420 U.S. at 489 (detailing the fundamental “face-off” between privacy rights 
and constitutional freedoms of speech and expression); Hill, 385 U.S. at 388 (“Exposure of 
the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The 
risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value 
on freedom of speech and of press.”); Scott Shackelford, supra note 22, at 145–47 (identi-
fying the newsworthiness of information and the public’s “right to know” as limitations to 
privacy rights of public figures). See generally Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy from History, 
61 DePaul L. Rev. 973 (2012) (tracing the historical development of privacy doctrines and 
their interplay with public figures, the rise of the media, and culture). 
107 See, e.g., Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56; Cox, 420 U.S. at 496. 
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1. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn and Publication of Private Facts 
 Beginning in 1975, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has consistently ruled in favor of the press and against the 
privacy interests of individuals and states aiming to protect their citi-
zens.108 In Cox, the family of a deceased murder victim sued a broadcast 
station for airing the victim’s name, which the defendants had obtained 
from a public courtroom record.109 The Court ruled, however, that the 
defendants could not be held liable under state privacy law when they 
publicized facts gathered from public records.110 Notably, the Court 
avoided the larger question of whether a state has the power to protect 
the privacy of individuals from unwanted publicity concerning true 
facts not obtained from public records.111 
 Although the Court has continued to limit the utility of the publi-
cation of private facts tort since Cox, it has never gone so far as to rule 
the tort unconstitutional.112 Instead, the Court has tailored its rulings to 
be as fact specific and narrow as possible so that no decision unreasona-
bly intrudes on the competing constitutional interests of expression and 
privacy.113 For example, in 1989, in The Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Supreme 
Court refused to impose liability on a newspaper for violating a Florida 
statute that prohibited the publication of a rape victim’s name through 
an “instrument of mass communication.” 114 In so doing, the Court rec-
ognized that if a state wants to impose civil liability on the publication of 
truthful information, the statute imposing liability must be narrowly tai-
                                                                                                                      
108 See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540–41 (1989) (holding that a Florida statute 
prohibiting the publication of a rape victim’s name was unconstitutional); Smith v. Daily 
Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104, 105–06 (1979) (holding that a West Virginia statute for-
bidding newspapers from publishing names of individuals charged as juvenile offenders 
was unconstitutional); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1977) (per 
curiam) (overturning an Oklahoma court’s trial order forbidding a newspaper from pub-
lishing a photo of a juvenile in a judicial proceeding); Cox, 420 U.S. at 496–97 (overturn-
ing a civil damages award in Georgia for publicizing a murder victim’s name gathered 
from a public indictment); see Edelman, supra note 8, at 1197–98; Zimmerman, supra note 
98, at 305–06. 
109 Cox, 420 U.S. at 472–74. 
110 Id. at 496–97. 
111 See id. at 491, 496–97. 
112 Edelman, supra note 8, at 1197–98. 
113 See, e.g., Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533, 541; Smith, 443 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring) (“While we have shown a special solicitude for freedom of speech and of the press, 
we have eschewed absolutes in favor of a more delicate calculus that carefully weighs the 
conflicting interests to determine which demands the greater protection under the par-
ticular circumstances presented.”). 
114 491 U.S. at 526, 541. 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1472 
lored to a state interest of “the highest order.”115 The court determined 
that the Florida statute—which was enacted to protect the privacy inter-
ests of sexual assault victims—was not narrowly tailored because it ap-
plied to mass media communications but not those of other sources 
(such as private individuals).116 In addition, the Court reasoned that the 
newspaper’s lawful obtainment of the rape victim’s name in a govern-
ment news release, as well as the statute’s negligence per se standard, did 
not comport with the guarantees of the First Amendment.117 
2. Snyder v. Phelps, Captive Audience, and Intrusion upon Seclusion 
 If the choice is between the government censoring offensive 
speech and the listener avoiding the speech, the First Amendment usu-
ally puts the burden on the listener to simply turn away.118 There is, 
however, an exception to this general premise: from time to time, the 
Supreme Court has used the captive audience doctrine to shield unwill-
ing listeners from otherwise protected speech.119 A plaintiff must show 
that a defendant’s offensive speech invades a substantial privacy interest 
in an “intolerable” manner.120 Given the state interest in protecting the 
sanctity of the home and the refuge it provides from society, courts 
have used the doctrine primarily to restrict speech directed at an indi-
vidual’s residence.121 
 In 2011, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court declined to expand 
the captive audience doctrine to allow recovery for an intrusion upon 
seclusion claim that had occurred in the public eye.122 Underlying the 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 Id. at 541. 
116 See id. at 540–41. 
117 See id. at 538–40. 
118 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975). 
119 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (applying the captive audience doc-
trine when upholding a city ordinance that prohibited picketing near the plaintiff’s 
home); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736, 738 (1970) (applying the cap-
tive audience doctrine when upholding a statute that allowed homeowners to limit deliver-
ies of offensive mail). The captive audience doctrine involves situations in which speech 
intrudes on privacy because, as a practical matter, the offensive speech is unavoidable. See 
generally Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 153 (1972) (commenting on the theory of a captive audience in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 85 (1991) (defining the captive audience doctrine and its confusing under-
standing of substantial privacy interests under First Amendment jurisprudence). 
120 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
121 See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484–85; Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736–38; Strauss, supra note 119, at 
91, 95. 
122 131 S. Ct. at 1220. In Snyder, the defendant was the founder of the Westboro Baptist 
Church, a congregation known for its intolerance of homosexuality in the United States 
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Court’s reasoning for not expanding the captive audience doctrine in 
Snyder was the distinction between speech of public concern and 
speech of private concern.123 Taking into account the content, context, 
and form of the speech, the Court determined that the defendants’ 
signs, although offensive, invited comment on public matters, and 
therefore were constitutionally protected forms of expression.124 In 
contrast, private speech, which addresses no public concerns, warrants 
far less constitutional protection.125 Even though government evalua-
tions regarding private speech are still policed for First Amendment 
violations, the risk of stifling public debate diminishes as the speech 
moves toward individual privacy interests.126 
 Thus, compared to the burden placed on plaintiffs bringing a pub-
lication of private facts tort, the burden on individuals bringing a claim 
for intrusion upon seclusion based on intrusive speech—though still 
substantial—is arguably less.127 This is particularly true if a plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the speech is of private concern rather than public 
concern.128 As a result, former public figures may be able to take ad-
vantage of this lesser burden of proof by asserting a claim for intrusion 
                                                                                                                      
military. Id. at 1213. To demonstrate this vitriol, the defendant and other church members 
set up a picketing site several hundred feet from the funeral procession of a marine killed 
in Iraq. Id. The plaintiff, who was the father of the fallen marine, claimed that he was a 
captive audience at the funeral, and therefore, that he could not avoid the intrusive nature 
of the picketing. Id. at 1219–20. The Court disagreed, stating that the plaintiff could not 
see the actual words on the signs and that the protestors stayed far away from the actual 
memorial service. Id. at 1220. 
123 See id. at 1215–16 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 762 (1985)); Dan Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some 
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 43–44 (2011) (characterizing the deci-
sion in Snyder as straightforward because the speech had a “communicative impact” on the 
public (citing Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 487 (1996))). 
124 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–17. 
125 See id. at 1215–16; Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760. 
126 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216 (“As in other First Amendment cases, the court is obli-
gated to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure 
that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759–60 (deter-
mining that regulating speech of purely private concern does not raise significant constitu-
tional concerns because such speech does not interfere with meaningful discussion of 
public issues). 
127 Compare Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 (suggesting that an intrusion upon seclusion 
claim based on offensive speech must invade a “substantial privacy interest”) (emphasis add-
ed), with Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (finding that publication of lawfully obtained truthful 
information trumps individual’s right to privacy unless doing so infringes on a state inter-
est “of the highest order” (emphasis added)). 
128 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216; Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760. 
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upon psychological seclusion rather than a claim for publication of pri-
vate facts.129 
II. Former Public Figures and Privacy: Trying to Avoid  
the Perpetual Spotlight 
 As hard as it is for private individuals to bring claims for invasion of 
privacy, public figures fare much worse.130 Diminished privacy rights 
are appropriate for all-purpose public figures because they cannot ex-
pect to keep details about their lives free from public scrutiny when 
they choose to make their actions and opinions matters of public con-
cern.131 This rationale also applies to some limited-purpose public fig-
ures due to the legitimate public concern in the particular public con-
troversy they are resolving.132 The public’s interest in some limited-
purpose public figures and involuntary public figures, however, may 
involve public controversies that do not address significant political or 
societal issues, or perhaps last for only a brief moment of time.133 Addi-
tionally, these individuals may live private lives for years before experi-
encing invasions of personal privacy.134 With these factors in play, 
courts have had difficulty determining when, and if, the privacy rights 
                                                                                                                      
129 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541. 
130 See, e.g., Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1229, 1236 (6th Cir. 1981) (ruling 
that the plaintiff, a public figure in rape trials that took place forty years prior to her def-
amation and false light claims for the historical reproduction of those trials, was still a pub-
lic figure); Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (denying recovery for 
the publication of truthful news story about a child prodigy thirty years after he became a 
public figure); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 35 (Idaho 2003) (ruling that 
the plaintiff, who was featured in a news story forty years earlier, could not recover for 
invasion of privacy because his name was taken from a public court record); Roshto v. 
Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 429, 431 (La. 1983) (ruling that the plaintiff, who was convicted of 
a crime twenty-five years prior to an invasion of privacy claim based on a newspaper’s re-
printing of an article about the trial, was still a matter of public concern). 
131 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 
374, 387–88 (1967). 
132 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974). 
133 See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 n.7 (1979) (declining to de-
cide when an individual loses status as a public figure due to the passage of time in the 
context of defamation); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (holding that the 
dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings involving wealthy individuals is not 
the type of “public controversy” that the First Amendment protects through its public fig-
ure doctrine). 
134 See supra note 21 (providing examples of public figures who have retreated into pri-
vate life). 
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of former limited-purpose and involuntary public figures return, and to 
what degree.135 
                                                                                                                     
 This Part examines how courts have treated public figures when 
asserting common law invasion of privacy claims for both intrusion up-
on seclusion and the publication of private facts.136 Section A explains 
how courts rely on a plaintiff’s public figure status when considering an 
invasion of privacy claim for the publication of private facts, but do not 
factor it into an intrusion upon seclusion analysis.137 Section B then 
details how courts have treated former public figures who have brought 
invasion of privacy claims.138 
A. Public Figures and Invasion of Privacy Claims 
1. Public Figure Status Irrelevant to Intrusion upon Seclusion 
 Public figures will often assert multiple invasion of privacy claims 
in one lawsuit in the hopes of recovering under at least one claim.139 
When evaluating a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a court will not 
typically consider a plaintiff’s status as a public figure.140 Even if the 
 
 
135 Compare Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–10 (denying recovery to a former child prodigy for 
the publication of a truthful news story written about the plaintiff thirty years after he be-
came a public figure), with Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (granting 
privacy protection to a reformed prostitute after a publication focused on her life story 
damaged her character and social standing). See generally Jones v. New Haven Register, Inc. 
763 A.2d 1097 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (discussing public figure status and the legacies of 
the 1940 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit case, Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. and 
the 1931 California Court of Appeals case, Melvin v. Reid); Stephen Bates, The Prostitute, the 
Prodigy, and the Private Past, 17 Comm. L. & Pol’y 175 (2012) (arguing that highly relevant 
facts in both Sidis and Melvin, if examined, may have caused the cases to turn out differ-
ently). 
136 See infra notes 137–196 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 139–168 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 169–196 and accompanying text. 
139 See, e.g., Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1217 (D.C. 1989) (denying claims for in-
trusion upon seclusion and publication of private facts against a magazine that published 
articles about a prominent businessman); Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 
1286, 1291–92 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (upholding claims for intrusion upon seclusion and publi-
cation of private facts against a news organization that had argued that the plaintiff, a pris-
oner, was a public figure); Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32, 35 (denying claims for intrusion upon 
seclusion, false light, and publication of private facts against a newspaper’s publication of 
the plaintiff’s name in a story recounting a forty-year-old sex scandal); Bilney v. Evening 
Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652, 654, 656, 659–60 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (denying 
claims for intrusion upon seclusion and publication of private facts against a newspaper 
for acquiring and publishing grades of college basketball players). 
140 See Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1288; Bilney, 406 A.2d at 657; see also Zimmerman, supra 
note 98, at 344–47 (explaining that a plaintiff’s status can be a gauge for whether facts are 
sufficiently private in a publication of private facts claim). But see McClurg, supra note 56, 
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plaintiff is deemed a public figure, there is no First Amendment protec-
tion for defendants who conduct highly intrusive behavior in the 
course of newsgathering.141 For example, in the 1986 case, Huskey v. 
National Broadcasting Co., the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois upheld a prisoner’s claims for invasion of privacy based 
on intrusion upon seclusion and publication of private facts.142 In 
Huskey, an NBC News crew gathered film about prison conditions fea-
turing the plaintiff, Arnold Huskey, and subsequently aired that footage 
nationally on the Today Show.143 The defendant, NBC, contended that 
Huskey’s status as a prisoner made him a limited-purpose public figure, 
and as such, a person with a very narrow expectation of privacy.144 
 The Huskey court recognized that raising a public figure defense 
“muddies the waters” between the intrusion upon seclusion and publi-
cation of private facts causes of action.145 Relying on this defense, NBC 
argued that an intrusion cannot be unlawful unless the publication 
amounts to an extraordinary revelation of a person’s private life.146 The 
court rejected this argument, stating that the plaintiff’s alleged public 
figure status was irrelevant to an intrusion upon seclusion claim.147 
Turning instead to the nature of Huskey’s seclusion, the court held that 
a person can still expect privacy in an area where he or she can be seen 
                                                                                                                      
at 1078–79 (arguing that although a plaintiff’s status is technically not a factor in an intru-
sion tort, it still enters the analysis of whether an intrusion is highly offensive). 
141 See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973); Dietemann v. Time, 
Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971); Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1288. 
142 632 F. Supp. at 1291–92. 
143 Id. at 1285. The footage captured Huskey sitting alone and shirtless for several 
minutes in a small prison exercise room. Id. He had not given consent to be taped, nor 
had he expected any persons besides prison personnel and inmates to be able to see him 
during his incarceration. Id. 
144 See id. at 1289–90. The defendant relied on comment f of section 652D of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts regarding publicity of prisoners, which states: 
Those who commit crime or are accused of it may not only not seek publicity 
but may make every possible effort to avoid it, but they are nevertheless per-
sons of public interest, concerning whom the public is entitled to be in-
formed. . . . As in the case of the voluntary public figure, the authorized pub-
licity is not limited to the event that itself arouses the public interest, and to 
some reasonable extent includes publicity given to facts about the individual 
that would otherwise be purely private. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. f (1977). 
145 632 F. Supp. at 1288; see also Richards & Solove, supra note 35, at 1920 (explaining 
that courts tend to interpret the intrusion upon seclusion and publication of private facts 
torts narrowly and avoid nuanced interpretations). 
146 See Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1286–87. 
147 Id. at 1288. 
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by others, especially if that person, like a prisoner, is normally secluded 
from the outside world.148 Furthermore, the court reasoned that film-
ing a prisoner without consent does not come within the purview of a 
prisoner’s crime and subsequent trial—those controversies that could 
make a prisoner a limited-purpose public figure.149 
 Even when plaintiffs would be considered public figures and assert 
both an intrusion upon seclusion claim and a publication of private 
facts claim, their public figure status still does not factor into the intru-
sion upon seclusion analysis.150 If a defendant acquired and further 
publicized facts already in the public sphere, then plaintiffs—regardless 
of whether they are deemed public figures—cannot claim that their 
privacy has been invaded.151 For instance, in the 2009 case, Harris v. 
Horton, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
claims for intrusion upon seclusion brought on behalf of their de-
ceased family member who, because of his recent death in a car crash, 
was deemed an involuntary public figure.152 The plaintiffs based their 
claim on the defendant’s use of photographs, which depicted the de-
ceased victim at the accident scene, in a driver’s education class.153 By 
having a closed casket funeral, the plaintiffs argued, they had “thrown a 
blanket of seclusion” on the photographs and the topic of the dece-
dent’s body, thereby creating a sufficient expectation of privacy.154 
Moreover, they argued that the photographs were private because the 
scene of the accident was closed to the public.155 The court disagreed, 
however, stating that displaying photographs taken in a public place 
could not intrude on the plaintiffs’ seclusion.156 In so doing, the court 
                                                                                                                      
148 Id. at 1288–89. 
149 See id. at 1290. 
150 See Wolf, 553 A.2d at 1218; Harris v. Horton, 341 S.W.3d 264, 271–72 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2009), overruled on other grounds by Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 
n.6 (Tenn. 2012); McClurg, supra note 56, at 1031, 1033–34. 
151 See Wolf, 553 A.2d at 1218; Harris, 341 S.W.3d at 271–72; McClurg, supra note 56, at 
1031, 1033–34 (noting that the level of privacy that the plaintiffs are entitled to can de-
pend on factors such as the information already known about them and the level of obscu-
rity they have from the public). 
152 See 341 S.W.3d at 271–72. Although Tennessee recognizes privacy as a personal 
right, the plaintiffs were able to bring a privacy claim based on the family’s protected rights 
to a decedent’s remains. Id. at 271 (citations omitted). 
153 Id. at 266–67, 271. 
154 Id. at 271. 
155 Id. 
156 See id. at 271–72. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not establish that 
the defendant had the requisite intent to intrude on their seclusion by displaying the pho-
tographs. Id. at 272. 
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reserved the plaintiff’s public figure status for its analysis of the publica-
tion of private facts claim.157 
2. Public Figure Status Relevant to Publication of Private Facts 
 A plaintiff’s status as a public figure often precludes recovery for 
invasion of privacy based on the publication of private facts because the 
issues that make a plaintiff a public figure are inherently matters of 
public concern.158 The importance society places on “newsworthy” in-
formation trumps an individual’s privacy interest in keeping those mat-
ters secret.159 Even for involuntary public figures, like the plaintiff’s son 
in Harris, the public interest in the free flow of information will typi-
cally outweigh an individual’s right to privacy.160 Thus, if the private 
facts publicize matters of public concern, plaintiffs cannot claim that 
their privacy was improperly invaded.161 
 To preclude public figures, both voluntary and involuntary, from 
recovering for publication of private facts, there must be a logical nexus 
between the disclosed facts and the facts that brought the individual 
into the public eye.162 Applying this principle, in 1979, in Bilney v. Eve-
ning Star Newspaper Co., the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held 
that six members of the University of Maryland (College Park) basket-
ball team could not recover for invasion of privacy based on a newspa-
per’s publication of information regarding their academic standing.163 
                                                                                                                      
157 See id. at 271–74. Similarly, in 1989, in Wolf v. Regardie, the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff could not maintain a claim for intrusion upon seclu-
sion based on a news magazine’s acquisition of information about the plaintiff gathered from 
third parties and public records. 553 A.2d at 1220. Although the court described the plaintiff, 
a real estate mogul in Washington, D.C., as “newsworthy,” it did not factor his status into its 
intrusion upon seclusion analysis. See id. at 1218–20, 1221. 
158 E.g., Hill, 385 U.S. at 386–88; Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922–23 (Cal. 1969) 
(en banc) (denying recovery based on the publication of private facts tort due to the 
plaintiff’s status as a candidate for city council); see Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming 
Privacy Torts, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1805, 1828 (2010). A study conducted from 1974 to 1984 
concluded that plaintiffs, regardless of their public figure status, succeeded in only 2.8% of 
publication of private facts claims against media defendants, and in only 12% of claims 
against non-media defendants. Citron, supra, at 1828 (citation omitted). 
159 See Kapellas, 450 P.2d at 922; Citron, supra note 158, at 1829. 
160 See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540–41 (1989); Cox, 420 U.S. at 494–95; Har-
ris, 341 S.W.3d at 273–74. 
161 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (b) (1977). 
162 E.g., Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); 
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998); Bilney, 406 A.2d at 660; see 
McNealy, supra note 21, at 128 (noting that the logical nexus test may sweep too broadly 
because most people are involved in activities of public concern). 
163 406 A.2d at 660. 
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Although the plaintiffs conceded that they were public figures due to 
their status as members of a prominent college basketball team that 
drew regional and national attention, they argued that their grades 
were purely private.164 The Bilney court determined, however, that the 
players’ academic standing formed a logical nexus with their member-
ship on the basketball team because the players’ academic perform-
ance could constitute grounds for exclusion from the team.165 
 What news entities, publishers, and individuals cannot do, how-
ever, is publicize private facts for the sole purpose of intruding on an 
individual’s private life and thereby disseminating information that has 
no social value in any decent community.166 Bilney is a good illustration 
of this community mores test for public figures: even though the publi-
cation of academic standing would likely infringe on a private student’s 
right to privacy, no reasonable community would be offended by the 
publication of such information regarding a student whose academic 
standing is crucial to his membership on a major college basketball 
team.167 Once this initial nexus threshold is satisfied, the press has 
every right to report on a story, whether it is for news, entertainment, 
education, or simple amusement.168 
                                                                                                                     
B. Former Public Figures: Once Public, Always Public? 
 Individuals who achieve public figure status lose some privacy 
rights due to the newsworthiness of their public activities.169 Yet a per-
son’s public status may diminish significantly over time.170 With the 
newsworthiness of their past activities, and, more broadly, the constitu-
 
164 Id. at 659. 
165 See id. at 660. 
166 See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809 (“Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in 
view of the victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of decency.”); Shulman, 
955 P.2d at 485 (stating that some reasonable members of the community must have le-
gitimate interest in a news story beyond voyeuristic motivations for its dissemination to be 
protected); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Com-
mon Law Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957, 1007 (1989) (stating that the protection of individual 
dignity must be weighed against the protection of community identity through the rules of 
civility when considering matters of legitimate public concern). 
167 See Bilney, 406 A.2d at 660. 
168 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485–86; Bilney, 406 A.2d at 660. 
169 E.g., Hill, 385 U.S. at 386–88; Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922–23; Bilney, 406 A.2d at 660. 
170 See Street, 645 F.2d at 1229 (describing a plaintiff who had been a public figure in a 
rape trials forty years prior to defamation and false light claims based on historical reproduc-
tion of trials); Roshto, 439 So. 2d at 429–30 (describing plaintiff who had been convicted of 
crime twenty-five years prior to invasion of privacy claim based on newspaper reprinting news 
article about trial). 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1480 
tional restraints on the tort of publication of private facts, however, 
former public figures have substantial difficulty trying to sustain an in-
vasion of privacy claim even when years have passed since they last were 
in the public spotlight.171 According to Professor Prosser, “once a man 
has become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate 
recall to the public mind to the end of his days.”172 Nevertheless, courts 
have considered the passage of time between the events that made a 
person a public figure and the alleged invasion of privacy.173 
 Courts typically have been reluctant to fully restore someone’s pri-
vate status by protecting the publication of facts that were once in the 
public forum, even if a long period of time has passed.174 Even though 
an individual may no longer be involved in public affairs, there may be 
a legitimate public interest in educating and informing the community 
about past events involving that person.175 This principle stems from 
the seminal 1940 case, Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., in which the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that a former child 
prodigy could not recover for common law invasion of privacy for a 
publication made decades after the events occurred that made him fa-
mous.176 After becoming famous for lecturing to prominent mathema-
ticians at age eleven and graduating from Harvard at age sixteen, the 
plaintiff, William Sidis, attempted to live a quiet, obscure life away from 
the public eye.177 In 1937, nearly thirty years after his childhood ac-
complishments, the New Yorker published a short biography and photo 
                                                                                                                      
171 See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 540–41; Cox, 420 U.S. at 495; Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1231–32 (7th Cir. 1993); Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–10; Shackelford, supra 
note 22, at 146. 
172 Prosser, supra note 35, at 418. 
173 See, e.g., Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–10; Melvin, 297 P. at 93; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35; Roshto, 439 
So. 2d at 431–32; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. k (1977) (“Such a 
lapse of time is, however, a factor to be considered, with other facts, in determining whether 
the publicity goes to unreasonable lengths in revealing facts about one who has resumed the 
private, lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community.”). 
174 See, e.g., Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1231, 1235; Street, 645 F.2d at 1236; Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–
10; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35 (“There is no indication that the First Amendment provides less 
protection to historians than to those reporting current events.”); Roshto, 439 So. 2d at 
431–32; see also McNealy, supra note 21, at 128 (explaining that, under American privacy 
law, the newsworthiness of information does not necessarily degrade over time). 
175 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. k (“Past events and activities may 
still be of legitimate interest to the public, and a narrative reviving recollection of what has 
happened even many years ago may be both interesting and valuable for purposes of in-
formation and education.”). 
176 113 F.2d at 809–10. 
177 Id. at 807. 
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of Sidis.178 The article explained Sidis’s life since his famed childhood, 
detailing his quirky hobbies and private lifestyle.179 
 Sidis is notorious for featuring one of the most sympathetic plain-
tiffs in all of privacy law.180 Indeed, the Sidis court recognized that the 
New Yorker article could be interpreted as a “ruthless exposure of a once 
public character, who has since sought and has now been deprived of 
the seclusion of private life.”181 Even so, the court found that the pub-
lic’s interest in his past affairs, especially concerning his potential for a 
bright future, was substantial enough to be considered newsworthy.182 
Therefore, the public’s right to know precluded recovery for invasion 
of privacy.183 
 Like the issue of private facts falling outside the realm of affairs 
that make a person public, the lapse of time factor considers whether 
the publication is consistent with notions of decency in the commu-
nity.184 In most situations, merely seeking amusement or quelling curi-
osity about a public figure who has since retreated to private life would 
not offend reasonable members of the community.185 
 To cross the threshold from purely educational news to a privacy 
invasion, a publication cannot be newsworthy or publicize any legiti-
mate public matter.186 This was the case in the 1931 case, Melvin v. Reid, 
in which the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of Califor-
nia decided that the publication of a former prostitute’s life story in a 
biopic several years after her murder acquittal constituted an invasion 
of privacy.187 The court acknowledged the plaintiff’s efforts to rehabili-
tate her life during the eight years following the murder trial, as well as 
the defendant’s sole purpose in producing the movie—to gain com-
mercial profit.188 
                                                                                                                      
178 Id. 
179 Id. Among Sidis’s interests were his passion for collecting streetcar transfers, his profi-
ciency with adding machines, and his fascination with the Okamakammesset Indians. Id. 
180 Zimmerman, supra note 98, at 323. 
181 Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807–08. 
182 See id. at 809. 
183 See id. at 809–10. 
184 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. k (1977) (“Again the question is to 
be determined upon the basis of community standards and mores.”). 
185 See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–10; Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485–86. 
186 See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485–86; Melvin, 297 P. at 93. 
187 See Melvin, 297 P. at 91, 93–94. 
188 See id.; see also Restatement (Second) Torts §652D cmt. k & illus. 26 (suggesting 
that reformed criminals who live private lives for a number of years may have an actionable 
invasion of privacy claim for the publication of crimes long forgotten in the community). 
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 Despite the decision in Melvin, modern courts have predominantly 
sided with the reasoning of the Sidis court.189 The main force behind 
this shift has been courts’ interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1975 decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, and its 1991 decision in 
The Florida Star v. B.J.F.190 Read broadly, Cox and Florida Star stand for 
the proposition that once private facts become publicized, a defendant 
cannot be held criminally or civilly liable for the republication of those 
facts.191 This is true even for cases involving rehabilitated criminals like 
the plaintiff in Melvin, notwithstanding the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ 
cautioning in this area.192 As an example, in 2004’s Gates v. Discovery 
Communications, Inc., the Supreme Court of California held that the 
publication of truthful facts regarding a former criminal obtained from 
public records did not constitute an invasion of privacy.193 The court’s 
opinion, relying heavily on Cox and Florida Star, illustrates that any state 
interests in protecting the anonymity of former criminals must yield to 
the First Amendment, at least when anonymity depends on facts con-
tained within public court records.194 
 Former public figures are thus left in a bind when it comes to lim-
iting a public reexamination of their lives through the use of the publi-
cation of private facts tort.195 Accordingly, these individuals need an 
alternative common law solution for actions that invade personal pri-
vacy.196 
                                                                                                                      
189 See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1231 (noting modern courts’ movement toward the Sidis view 
of privacy and away from Melvin); Jones, 763 A.2d at 1101 (same). 
190 See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 540–41; Cox, 420 U.S. at 494–95; Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232 (stat-
ing that the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in Cox and Florida Star re-
garding the tort for publication of private facts are “profound”); Zimmerman, supra note 
98, at 306 (arguing that a proper reading of Cox requires the constitutional protection of 
the publication of true statements). 
191 See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 540–41; Cox, 420 U.S. at 494–95; Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; 
Edelman, supra note 8, at 1202, 1204 (determining that Florida Star has established the 
“lawfully obtained” defense for the publication of private facts tort). 
192 See Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 562 (Cal. 2004); Jones, 763 A.2d 
at 1101. But see Roshto, 439 So. 2d at 431 (describing a hypothetical situation in which a 
rehabilitated criminal could recover for publication of private facts); supra note 190 and 
accompanying text (explaining that rehabilitated criminals may be able to recover for 
invasion of privacy when an individual publicizes their criminal past). 
193 101 P.3d at 555. The Gates court overruled the 1971 decision by the California Su-
preme Court in Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, which barred the publication of truthful, but 
not newsworthy, facts regarding a rehabilitated criminal. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 
483 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. 1971) (en banc), overruled by Gates, 101 P.3d at 555. 
194 See Gates, 101 P.3d at 556, 558–60, 562. 
195 See supra notes 158–194 and accompanying text. 
196 See infra notes 197–270 and accompanying text. 
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III. Fading into Privacy: Making the Case for Former Public 
Figures’ Use of Intrusion upon Psychological Seclusion 
 Psychological seclusion provides an underutilized common law 
option for former public figures whose private lives have been exposed 
to the public sphere.197 This Part argues for upholding claims for intru-
sions upon psychological seclusion brought by former public figures, 
whether limited purpose or involuntary, based on an offensive dissemi-
nation of information regarding their most private affairs.198 Section A 
puts forth a prima facie case for intrusion upon a former public figure’s 
psychological seclusion.199 Section B then details the legal hurdles that 
would inevitably curtail a widespread use of this cause of action.200 Fi-
nally, Section C argues that, notwithstanding these limitations, the 
growing number of former public figures and the changing notions of 
personal privacy in today’s social media-driven culture provide the nec-
essary policy justifications for expanding psychological seclusion.201 
A. Establishing Psychological Seclusion in Former Public Figures’  
Emotional Affairs: The Prima Facie Case 
  Former public figures can establish a claim for intrusion upon 
psychological seclusion through the dissemination of information in 
the public sphere by demonstrating that disclosing the information was 
offensive and violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.202 Reason-
able communities recognize private spaces in the public sphere, includ-
ing emotional spaces.203 Moreover, because psychological seclusion pro-
tects the specific psychological well-being of each plaintiff, former 
public figures’ fundamental yearning for privacy—in conjunction with 
                                                                                                                      
197 See, e.g., McSurely v. McClennan, 753 F.2d 88, 112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Phillips v. 
Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc. (Phillips I ), 711 F.2d 1524, 1536–37 (11th Cir. 1983); Van Jelger-
huis v. Mercury Fin. Co., 940 F. Supp. 1344, 1368 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Russell v. Salve Regina 
Coll. (Russell I ), 649 F. Supp. 391, 404 (D.R.I. 1986). 
198 See infra notes 202–270 and accompanying text. 
199 See infra notes 202–224 and accompanying text. 
200 See infra notes 225–252 and accompanying text. 
201 See infra notes 253–270 and accompanying text. 
202 See McSurely, 753 F.2d at 112–13; Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Russell I, 649 F. 
Supp. at 404; Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Roshto v. Hebert, 439 
So. 2d 428, 431 (La. 1983). 
203 See Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (implying that 
individuals can establish seclusion in spaces viewable to the public); Sanders v. Am. Broad. 
Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 77 (Cal. 1999) (finding that a journalist’s covert videotaping of an em-
ployee in the workplace could constitute an unreasonable intrusion); Daniel J. Solove, A 
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 556 (2006). 
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the actions they have taken to protect their privacy—would bolster the 
expectation of privacy they have in their nonpublic affairs.204 Once they 
have established this seclusion, former public figures would then be 
able to show that intruding into these zones of privacy can occur 
through highly offensive disclosures because their privacy interest in 
seclusion trumps the social value in recalling their lives.205 
 Recognizing an expectation of privacy in a former public figure’s 
seclusion is reasonable because intrusions into emotional spaces can 
occur in public spaces and public forums.206 These “territories of self,” 
as one scholar has termed them, are defined and shaped by the com-
munity’s customs and rules of social interaction.207 Even more funda-
mentally, a community’s sense of privacy stems in part from the indi-
vidual experiences of its collective members.208 Having seclusion in 
one’s thoughts, emotions, and decisions not only promotes human 
dignity, but also self-autonomy.209 Giving former public figures the 
choice to seclude to a deep emotional sphere and keep it free from 
public examination demonstrates both the individuals’ expression to 
be left alone and the community’s respect for that choice.210 
 Moreover, psychological seclusion emphasizes the specific emo-
tional needs of the plaintiff that help maintain psychic integrity.211 For 
those individuals especially troubled by their public past, like Sidis, the 
desire to retreat from the public eye is arguably their most important 
emotional need.212 As a result, a community could conclude that an 
                                                                                                                      
204 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1537; Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 404; Melvin, 297 P. at 93–94. 
Bates, supra note 135, at 229–30 (arguing that it would be offensive to publish information 
knowing that the subject of the publication is hypersensitive to invasions of privacy). 
205 See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995–96 (2d Cir. 1973); Bates, supra note 135, at 
229–30. 
206 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1535–37; Van Jelgerhuis, 940 F. Supp. at 1368; Russell I, 649 F. 
Supp. at 404; Melvin, 297 P. at 93–94; Post, supra note 166, at 971–73. 
207 See Post, supra note 166, at 971–73 (discussing Erving Goffman, The Territories of the 
Self, in Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order 28 (Transaction Pub-
lishers 2010) (1971)). 
208 See id. 
209 See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 498 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J., 
concurring) (“Preserving a sphere of private thought, speech, and action, and controlling 
who are to be let into that sphere and the conditions under which they may enter, is an 
essential part of human dignity and autonomy.”). 
210 See Post, supra note 166, at 973–74; Amy Kristin Sanders & Natalie Christine Olsen, 
Re-Defining Defamation: Psychological Sense of Community in the Age of the Internet, 17 Comm. L. 
& Pol’y 355, 361 (2012) (noting that limiting individuals’ ability to seek self-fulfillment 
through expression disrespects their dignity). 
211 See Elder, supra note 81, at 43. 
212 See Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); Bates, supra note 135, 
at 216–17. 
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expectation of privacy exists in a public reexamination of the individual 
because that action intrudes on a former public figure’s emotional 
sanctum.213 
 Once establishing a former public figure’s privacy entitlement in 
psychological seclusion, these individuals could show that prying into 
that seclusion through a public reexamination that reveals new, private 
information could satisfy the offensive element of the tort.214 Although 
piquing the public interest through the public examination of former 
public figures offers some educational and historical value, the offen-
sive element in intrusion upon psychological seclusion has little to do 
with the community’s need for public knowledge and more to do with 
reinforcing social barriers to human interaction.215 Those social barri-
ers do not necessarily dissipate in the public sphere because intrusions 
do not have to be surreptitious.216 Courts will thus focus on all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the intrusion itself, including the degree of 
public examination and the context of the examination, to see whether 
it could be highly offensive to a reasonable person.217 
 Even still, it is unlikely that courts will avoid looking at the content 
of the intrusion when evaluating the degree of offensiveness in an al-
leged intrusion, thereby triggering a First Amendment analysis.218 With-
in that analysis, a court would need to determine that the public dis-
course constituting a claim for intrusion upon psychological seclusion 
violates a substantial privacy interest in an “intolerable” manner.219 
Former public figures have a substantial privacy interest in preserving 
their regained anonymity and private lives in their communities.220 If 
these individuals affirmatively seek and retain an obscure lifestyle, then 
trampling on that regained emotional sanctum of seclusion through 
public discourse that hounds and pries into that space could be viewed 
                                                                                                                      
213 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 404; Post, supra note 166, 
at 973–74. 
214 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 404. 
215 See Solove, supra note 203, at 554–56 (recognizing that solitude enhances social re-
lationships and reinforces boundaries of social space and structure). 
216 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1535; Bennett v. Norban. 151 A.2d 476, 477, 479 (Penn. 
1959); McClurg, supra note 56, at 1055. 
217 See Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1074 (Cal. 2009). 
218 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219–20 (2011); see also Hustler v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (rejecting a public figure’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim based on the publication of a caricature in a national magazine). 
219 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
220 See McNealy, supra note 21, at 121 (recognizing an individual’s interest in regaining 
a “clean slate” in society); Solove, supra note 203, at 555 (noting that solitude enriches 
public life by allowing individuals to rest from experiencing societal pressures). 
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as patently offensive because it thrusts these individuals back into the 
public spotlight and takes away their autonomy.221 
 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s emphasis on avoiding broad 
holdings in First Amendment cases would not create such binding psy-
chological seclusion precedent that could mark an unconstitutional 
abridgment of the free expression of ideas.222 Determining the offen-
siveness element and distinguishing speech of public concern from pri-
vate concern turn on similar factors, ensuring that the analysis fairly ad-
dresses competing rights to privacy and free speech.223 Accordingly, the 
intrusive speech in one former public figure psychological seclusion 
case may not necessarily be grounds for liability in another case.224 
B. The Hurdles Facing a Former Public Figure’s Use of Psychological Seclusion 
1. Constitutional Considerations 
 Because intrusions upon the psychological seclusion of former 
public figures require the use of offensive speech, the First Amendment 
limits the widespread use of this cause of action.225 If the speech con-
cerning the former public figure is a matter of public concern, the 
speech would gain the highest protection under the First Amend-
ment.226 Moreover, even if society finds the speech offensive, the First 
Amendment does not allow the prohibition of such speech solely based 
on the ideas that it expresses.227 
                                                                                                                      
221 See Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1072 (stating that the intrusion upon seclusion tort “rec-
ognizes a measure of personal control over the individual’s autonomy, dignity, and seren-
ity”); Sanders & Olsen, supra note 210, at 361; Solove, supra note 203, at 555. 
222 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220; Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989). 
223 Compare Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–17 (evaluating the question of public speech ver-
sus private speech according to context, content, and form of expression), with Hernandez, 
211 P.3d at 1074 (evaluating the offensiveness of an intrusion upon seclusion claim accord-
ing to several objective factors surrounding the intrusion, including the context and de-
gree of intrusion). 
224 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541. 
225 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219–20; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56–57; 
McSurely, 753 F.2d at 112–13; Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Melvin, 297 P. at 93. 
226 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct at 1215 (explaining that speech concerning matters of public 
concern must receive “special protection” under the First Amendment so that courts avoid 
censoring public debate); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 758–59 (1985) (“It is speech on matters of public concern that is at the heart of the 
First Amendment’s protection.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
227 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle un-
derlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression 
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
1487 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
 Along with speech of public concern, simply recalling information 
regarding a former public figure without revealing new, private details 
in an offensive manner also would not create liability for intrusion up-
on psychological seclusion.228 Given the broad implications of the Su-
preme Court’s 1975 ruling in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, as well as 
the attempts to establish psychological seclusion in the public eye, a 
court would likely not recognize an expectation of privacy in informa-
tion that has previously entered the public forum.229 For instance, in 
2000, in Uranga v. Federated Publications, Inc., the Supreme Court of Ida-
ho held that the publication of a news story concerning the plaintiff, 
published forty years after the events for which the plaintiff was famous 
occurred, constituted neither intrusion upon seclusion nor publication 
of private facts.230 The Uranga court declined to distinguish the case 
based on the period of time between the publication of court docu-
ments and the underlying public events.231 Absent a standard that 
would give the media notice of when publicizing information could 
lead to state tort liability, allowing plaintiffs to recover for invasion of 
privacy may chill public debate and thereby decrease awareness of mat-
ters of public concern.232 
 Finally, former public figures would likely face a high degree of 
proof when bringing a claim for intrusion upon psychological seclu-
sion.233 In light of the broad reach of the First Amendment, the Su-
preme Court has limited the ability of public figures to recover for 
                                                                                                                      
228 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns 
Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 562 (Cal. 2004); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 32, 35 
(Idaho 2003); Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652, 657, 659–60 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1979); Harris v. Horton, 341 S.W.3d 264, 271–74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009), overruled 
on other grounds by Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 n.6 (Tenn. 2012); Zim-
merman, supra note 98, at 348–50. 
229 See 420 U.S. at 495; Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 
1993); Gates, 101 P.3d at 559–60; Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 858 (R.I. 1998); Harris, 
341 S.W.3d at 272–74; Richards & Solove, supra note 35, at 1919; see also Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941) (“No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the 
freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness 
and importance of the ideas seeking expression.”). 
230 67 P.3d at 32, 35. The front-page news story recounted the “Boys of Boise” scandal, 
an investigation involving adult gay men soliciting teenage boys for sex outside a YMCA. Id. 
at 30–31. Although the news story did not mention the plaintiff by name, it included a 
reproduced photograph of an affidavit submitted in conjunction with the investigation 
that included the plaintiff’s name. Id. 
231 See id. at 35. 
232 See id. 
233 See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53, 55–56; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967). 
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state-based torts that involve emotional injuries.234 In 1989, in Hustler v. 
Falwell, the Court held that an all-purpose public figure could not re-
cover for intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing by 
clear and convincing evidence that the publication contained false 
statements of fact made with “actual malice.”235 Because psychological 
seclusion also involves damage to an individual’s interest in emotional 
sanctity, a court following Hustler may hold former public figures with 
wide and pervasive notoriety to a similar burden.236 A court may, how-
ever, view a former limited-purpose or involuntary public figure’s effort 
to recover for emotional injury in a more favorable light if that person 
has made efforts to avoid media attention.237 
2. Subject Matter Limitations 
 In addition to First Amendment considerations, former public fig-
ures would also have to confront some subject matter limitations regard-
ing the content of a claim for intrusion upon psychological seclusion.238 
Just as reexamining topics already in the public sphere would fall short 
of creating liability, so too would issues that have a logical connection to 
what made the former public figures public in the first place.239 Regard-
less of whether an individual would be considered a limited-purpose or 
an involuntary public figure, there is still a legitimate public interest in 
knowing how the issues in which they were involved were ultimately re-
solved.240 This public interest would protect the disclosure of facts that 
were newly gathered and subsequently revealed if they are sufficiently 
related to the original matter of public concern.241 
 On the other hand, publicly prying into information regarding a 
former public figure’s sexual relations, medical history, or other inti-
mate private details that have never entered the public sphere would 
warrant a privacy expectation that intrusion upon psychological seclu-
                                                                                                                      
234 See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53, 55–56; Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88. 
235 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. 
236 See id. at 53, 55–56; Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37. 
237 Cf. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 171 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (concluding that the passage of sixteen years between the public controversy making 
the plaintiff a public figure and the alleged defamation restored the plaintiff to private figure 
status due to the decreased ability to counter false speech through the media). 
238 See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–10; Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485; Bilney, 406 A.2d at 659–60. 
239 See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–10; Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485; Bilney, 406 A.2d at 659–60. 
240 See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809–10. 
241 See id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h (1977). 
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sion would be able to protect.242 Although the public may be curious 
about the intimate lives of former public figures, the investigation of an 
individual’s sexual conduct intrudes on perhaps the deepest private 
emotional sphere a person can possess.243 It may also indicate that the 
intruder is fulfilling a “voyeuristic thrill” of prying into a zone of privacy 
that a community would recognize is off-limits to public discourse.244 
Assuming that these intimate affairs were not what made an individual 
famous in the first place, a former public figure, whether limited pur-
pose or involuntary, could show that examining these affairs would in-
trude on an inner emotional space that had no logical nexus to his or 
her public figure status.245 
3. Offensive to Whom? Overcoming the Objective Elements 
 The objective nature of the intrusion upon seclusion elements 
creates a final hurdle for former public figures trying to establish psy-
chological seclusion.246 Determining that a privacy expectation is objec-
tively reasonable and that an intrusion is highly offensive to a reason-
able person naturally pits a former public figure’s understanding of his 
or her sphere of privacy against what a community would consider to 
be private.247 A community’s understanding of what locations or subject 
                                                                                                                      
 
242 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 404; Zimmerman, supra 
note 98, at 348–50; see also Bates, supra note 135, at 217 (suggesting that the public discus-
sion of an individual’s ongoing mental illness would be offensive to a reasonable person 
because it carries the label of society’s “ultimate stigma”). 
243 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h 
(“There may be some intimate details of her life, such as sexual relations, which even the 
actress is entitled to keep to herself.”). 
244 See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232 (hypothesizing that a community would have been most 
offended if the questioned publication had detailed the plaintiff’s sex life); Phillips I, 711 
F.2d at 1536–37. Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 404; Bates, supra note 135, at 217. 
245 See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37. 
246 See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812–13 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (qualifying plaintiff’s subjective expectation of solitude or seclusion according 
to whether that expectation is objectively reasonable); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 
1421 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1074; Citron, supra note 158, at 1828–30 
(highlighting the problems with privacy’s restrictive elements). 
247 See Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 878–79 (8th 
Cir. 2000); Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 
Ohio St. L.J. 671, 694 (1996) (explaining that courts must determine entitlements to 
privacy within the context of community norms). As an example, in 2000, in Fletcher v. Price 
Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that 
the threat posed by the plaintiff’s communicable disease to her restaurant-industry work-
place trumped her individual privacy expectation in her medical information. 220 F.3d at 
878–79. As a preliminary matter, the court considered the plaintiff’s subjective privacy 
expectations, but later determined that the plaintiff relinquished any entitlement to pri-
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matters former public figures are entitled to keep in seclusion would 
act as a counterbalance against particularly “thin-skinned” former pub-
lic figures who have strong subjective, but nonetheless unreasonable, 
feelings that their privacy has been invaded.248 
 Any inquiry into an intrusion claim, however, should look at all the 
circumstances involved, including a former public figure’s own subjec-
tive sense of privacy and mental integrity.249 Because psychological se-
clusion focuses on the intrusion into a particular plaintiff’s emotional 
sphere, one factor that courts would have to examine is the impact of 
public discourse on a former public figure’s own psyche.250 A court 
could also look to affirmative steps taken by former public figures to 
seclude themselves in privacy.251 Such actions, like changing a name, 
address, or career, avoiding contact with the media, or participating in 
public affairs would not only manifest an objective intent to secure a 
private life, but would also demonstrate that achieving such seclusion is 
critical to a former public figure’s psychological well-being.252 
C. Social Media and the Need to Evolve Privacy 
 Notwithstanding the hurdles described above, certain former pub-
lic figures must be permitted to protect their emotional security by rely-
                                                                                                                      
vacy by telling her coworkers about her disease. See id. at 877–78. Regardless of the plain-
tiff’s own privacy expectations, however, the court demonstrated that when a community 
demands the right to know—in this case, for public health reasons—a reasonable person 
cannot conclude that a person is entitled to privacy. See id. at 878–79. 
248 See Kim, supra note 247, at 689–90 (explaining that elements of privacy torts retain 
objective qualities to protect defendants from claims brought by mentally weak plaintiffs); 
see also Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1033, 1035 (1936) (“Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing 
of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the 
mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.”). 
249 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Van Jelgerhuis, 940 F. Supp. at 1368; Russell I, 649 F. 
Supp. at 404; Melvin, 297 P. at 93–94; Post, supra note 166, at 969 (discussing the problems 
associated with understanding privacy through “neutral” criteria rather than normative con-
siderations). 
250 See McClurg, supra note 56, at 1072–73 (noting that the dissemination of information, 
rather than the initial acquisition, is the most offensive part of an invasion of privacy). 
251 See Roshto, 439 So. 2d at 431; Barbas, supra note 106, at 1046–47 (proposing a more 
contextual and fluid approach to defining expectations of privacy); McClurg, supra note 
56, at 1067–69. 
252 See Roshto, 439 So. 2d at 431 & n.6 (hypothesizing that a rehabilitated criminal’s 
change in name and address, and concerted effort to maintain obscurity would all be fac-
tors for holding a defendant liable for an injury to mental anguish); Barbas, supra note 
106, at 1046–47; McClurg, supra note 56, at 1067–69 (proposing factors such as whether a 
plaintiff consented to intrusion or manifested an intent to remain secluded in evaluating 
the offensiveness of an intrusion upon seclusion claim). 
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ing on a claim for intrusion upon psychological seclusion.253 As this 
Note has put forth, several requirements must be met to establish a 
claim.254 The offensive public discourse must be a matter of private 
concern and involve a degree of examination that reveals new, personal 
details that have no relation to what made these individuals public fig-
ures in the first place.255 Higher degrees of proof may also be a neces-
sary compromise to ensure adequate protection for defendants and 
curtail a rampant, misguided use of the tort.256 Additionally, courts 
should recognize how former public figures have demonstrated their 
intent to seek seclusion to ensure that the analysis remains primarily 
objective.257 Together, these considerations limit intrusion upon psy-
chological seclusion to those compelling fact patterns where a former 
public figure’s privacy interest is in accordance with what a reasonable 
community would tolerate, and, ultimately, what the First Amendment 
would not proscribe.258 
 Consider, though, that under the First Amendment formulation of 
public figures, social-media participation and the Internet have created 
countless limited-purpose, and arguably involuntary, public figures.259 
The current privacy paradigm cannot sufficiently accommodate the 
interest in secluding oneself from intrusive public comment.260 Al-
though there are aspects of an individual’s life that are free from the 
public eye, there are also other aspects that are publicly accessible.261 
Moreover, because community members measure privacy expectations 
by their own individual experiences, the increasing number of public 
figures rising to prominence through social media may demand more 
                                                                                                                      
253 See Phillips I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Galella, 487 F.2d 986, 995–96; Russell I, 649 F. 
Supp. at 404; Melvin, 297 P. at 93–94. 
254 See supra notes 202–252 and accompanying text. 
255 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541; Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232. 
256 See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. 
257 See Roshto, 439 So. 2d at 431; Barbas, supra note 106, at 1046–47; McClurg, supra 
note 56, at 1067–69 (implying that explicit and implicit manifestations of a person’s desire 
to remain private provide evidence that an intrusion is offensive). 
258 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56; Phillips 
I, 711 F.2d at 1536–37; Van Jelgerhuis, 940 F. Supp. at 1368; Russell I, 649 F. Supp. at 404. 
259 See Jeff Kosseff, Private or Public? Eliminating the Gertz Defamation Test, 2011 U. Ill. 
J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 249, 271–72 (suggesting that the voluntariness element of the public 
figure test has made private individuals who use social media limited-purpose public fig-
ures). 
260 See Citron, supra note 158, at 1830. 
261 See id. at 1852; Richards & Solove, supra note 35, at 1920 (describing the inability of 
common law privacy to find an intermediate stage for public information that has not yet 
been aggregated and disseminated to a large audience). 
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respect for those who have chosen to leave the public sphere.262 The 
current understanding of privacy does not fit neatly into the compart-
mentalized common law scheme.263 
 In this dimension, then, expanding the use of psychological seclu-
sion for former involuntary and limited-purpose public figures would 
certainly “muddy the waters” of common law invasion of privacy, but it 
is not as if those waters are already crystal clear.264 Common law inva-
sion of privacy seeks to constantly reinforce social norms through the 
law.265 Intrusion upon seclusion, in particular, was originally contem-
plated to fill the gaps between trespass and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.266 Psychological seclusion would just be a logical 
extension of the tort that adapts our understanding of seclusion to new 
social spaces and technologies.267 
 The social landscape is also changing our understanding of com-
munities and the media, undermining some of the traditional defenses 
relied upon in common law invasion of privacy.268 The newsworthiness 
defense, for example, may not rely so much on established media enti-
ties determining the news but rather on a collective societal under-
standing of public matters experienced through social media and blog-
ging.269 Therefore, it may be incumbent on courts to take a stand on 
what actually constitute matters of legitimate public concern, a step that 
would properly guide the scope of claims for psychological seclusion 
brought by former public figures.270 
                                                                                                                      
262 See Post, supra note 166, at 971–74; Solove, supra note 205, at 554–56. By not par-
ticipating in social media, these individuals demonstrate their desire to retain privacy and 
form a social barrier between themselves and those who seek these types of interactions. 
See Post, supra note 166, at 971–74; Solove, supra note 205, at 554–56. 
263 See Solove, supra note 205, at 483. 
264 See Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1288; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A cmt. d 
(1977) (“It is possible and not infrequent for privacy to be invaded by the same act or by a 
series of acts in two or more of the ways stated in §§ 652B to 652E.”). 
265 See Citron, supra note 158, at 1830; Kim, supra note 247, at 690–91; Richards & So-
love, supra note 35, at 1918. 
266 See Prosser, supra note 35, at 392. 
267 See Citron, supra note 158, at 1830; Kim, supra note 247, at 690–91. 
268 See Barbas, supra note 106, at 1043–44 (explaining that free flow of information has 
reduced the need for news concerning the private lives of public figures). 
269 See Richards & Solove, supra note 35, at 1918–19. 
270 See Shackelford, supra note 22, at 199; see also Quin S. Landon, Note, The First Amend-
ment and Speech-Based Torts: Recalibrating the Balance, 66 U. Miami L. Rev. 157, 181 (2011) 
(suggesting that a public concern test for speech-based privacy torts would provide the best 
balance between First Amendment and privacy interests). 
1493 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
Conclusion 
 It is hard to imagine that an individual like Jodie Foster will ever be 
a former public figure; her fame and notoriety stemming from her 
award-winning film career will make her, for better or worse, a public 
figure for the rest of her life. Nevertheless, the message she conveyed is 
clear: for those who become public figures, privacy becomes one of the 
most sought-after emotional needs. Using the concept of psychological 
seclusion to cover intrusive examinations of former public figures in 
the public sphere would provide these individuals an underutilized 
common law cause of action. 
 Seclusion is not just limited to physical spaces; individuals have a 
right to be free from intrusions into personal affairs that warrant an 
expectation of privacy. Prying into these affairs through a public reex-
amination of a former public figure who has taken numerous steps to 
recede from public life would be deemed offensive because it impedes 
the individual’s pursuit of a fundamental emotional desire—privacy. 
Although there are significant constitutional hurdles facing this poten-
tial cause of action, limiting the subject matter and increasing degrees 
of proof could work to balance the competing interests of privacy and 
freedom of expression. Considering the movement of society’s public 
spaces from the physical world to the world of constant online social 
interaction and the sheer number of public figures that this space cre-
ates, psychological seclusion provides a common law privacy solution 
for an individual who just wants to be left alone. 
